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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE
NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYZES PRISON
SECURITY POLICY WITH "DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE" TO PENOLOGICAL NEEDS
IN JORDAN v. GARDNER
The Eighth Amendment' of the United States Constitution
provides prisoners with broad protections against "cruel and unusual punishments." 2 Originally proscribing only cruel methods of
punishment,3 the Eighth Amendment has been extended to pro1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
2 Id.; see JAMiEs J. GOBERT & NEAL P. COHEN, RIGHTS OF Pi soNEPs § 11.02, at
314 (1981).
Cruel and unusual is generally treated as a phrase, a three word term of art;
there appears to be little attempt to examine separately the meaning of
either of the two principal words. This is perhaps just as well, for major conceptual difficulties might arise if the term "unusual" were interpreted to
have independent definitional significance. For example, if all prison guards
routinely beat inmates for the sheer sadistic pleasure of the experience, it
could hardly be said that such beatings were unusual. Yet surely courts
would agree that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment.
Id.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979), the Supreme Court listed several
factors which indicate whether a governmental act is punitive in nature: whether it
involves an "affirmative disability or restraint"; whether the act has traditionally
been thought of as punishment; whether it fosters "traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence"; and whether the governmental act is itself response to
crime. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). See
generally GOBERT & COHEN, supra, § 11.01, at 310-12 (defining punishment in general
terms and contrasting Bell Court's position); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.6, at 360-66
(2d ed. 1992) (reviewing several Supreme Court cases related to issue of punishment).
3 See GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 2, § 11.02, at 312; Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV.
839, 847 (1969) (postulating that original meaning of Eighth Amendment came from
misinterpretation of British law).
The Supreme Court began to apply the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to
penalties that were disproportionate to the crime committed after Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (finding 15 years hard labor cruel and unusual punishment for falsifying public document). See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (holding that denationalization was cruel and unusual punishment for crime of
military desertion). For a discussion of Eighth Amendment history, see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-76 (1976); Ronald H. Rosenberg, ConstitutionalLaw-The

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:259

tect against unwarranted uses of force 4 and serious deprivations
of basic needs-such as medical attention5 and reasonable sanitation 6-suffered during imprisonment.7 The obstacle to prisoners'
Eighth Amendment claims, however, has been the difficult legal
standard that must be satisfied.8 In particular, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant not only injured the plaintiff, but did so
in a manner evincing a culpable state of mind. 9 In this regard,
culpability is measured under one of two applicable standards:
"deliberate indifference," 10 which applies when inmates allege
harmful conditions of confinement,"- or malicious intent,' 2 which
Eighth Amendment and PrisonReform, 51 N.C. L. REv. 1539, 1540-50 (1973); Granucci, supra.
4 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing application of Eighth
Amendment to excessive force claims); see also infra note 7 (contrasting low objective
requirement, i.e., significant injury not required in excessive force cases, with serious
deprivation necessary to state conditions of confinement claim).
5 See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Amendment
application to medical needs).
6 See infra note 89 and accompanying text (recognizing sanitation as basic need
implicating Eighth Amendment).
7 See GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 2, § 11.02, at 312-14; Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.
Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (first instance in
which Eighth Amendment applied to injury suffered during imprisonment but was
not part of sentence)).
The Supreme Court has held that a serious deprivation is required to state a
claim based on conditions of confinement. See infra note 45 and accompanying text
(discussing extent of physical harm required in Eighth Amendment challenge of
prison conditions). Moreover, the deprivation must be of a specific human need. Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2327; see infra note 76 (listing some of the needs that qualify); infra
note 89 (same). By contrast, "when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use
force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated." Hudson
v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000 (1992). Thus no serious injury need be claimed. Id.
See generally Diana L. Nelson, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Standardof
EighthAmendment Application to the Use of Excessive ForceAgainst PrisonInmates,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1814, 1836 (1993) (stating that Hudson Court's decision not to require
serious injury overshadowed continuation of burdensome mens rea requirement).
8 See, e.g., Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2331 (White, J., concurring) ("The ultimate result
of today's decision, I fear, is that 'serious deprivations of basic human needs' will go
unredressed due to an unnecessary and meaningless search for 'deliberate indifference.' "(citation omitted)); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'unnecessary and wanton' standard... establishes a high hurdle to be overcome by a prisoner seeking relief for a constitutional violation.").
9 The culpable state of mind is typically referred to as "wantonness," originating
from the phrase "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley, 475 U.S. at
319; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)); see Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 998; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977).
10 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
11 See Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27.
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applies when use of force is challenged as excessive. 13 When the
challenged action does not conform neatly to either of the categories-"condition" or "force"-the method for choosing which standard applies is unclear.' 4 Recently, in Jordan v. Gardner,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the
deliberate indifference standard to a prison security policy that required male guards to conduct random clothed-body searches of
female inmates. Concluding that such policy evinced the "unnecthat the
essary and wanton" infliction of pain, 16 the court held
7
violated.
were
rights
Amendment
prisoners' Eighth
In Jordan,inmates at the Washington Corrections Center for
Women challenged a policy which mandated that both male and
female guards perform random clothed-body searches of inmates.' 8 According to the facility's superintendent,' 9 the policy
had been implemented to stem the steadily rising flow of contra12 See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998 ("[T]he question whether the measure taken
inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'") (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at
320-21, in turn quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom.John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
13 Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-99.
14 See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The
Jordancourt treated a search policy as a condition rather than a use of force because
it "was developed over time, with ample opportunity for reflection." Id. Moreover,
stated the court, such a policy would "not inflict pain on a one-time basis; instead, as
with substandard conditions of confinement, the policy [would] continue to inflict pain
upon the inmates indefinitely." Id. But see id. at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting) (arguing
that deliberate indifference is inapplicable where, in official's judgment, equally important governmental responsibilities exist).
15 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
16 Id. at 1525 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, in turn quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
17 Id. at 1530-31.
18 Id. at 1523. The Jordan court described the search procedure as follows:
[T]he male guard stands next to the female inmate and thoroughly runs his
hands over her clothed body starting with her neck and working down to her
feet. According to the prison training material, a guard is to "[u]se a flat
hand and pushing motion across the [inmate's] crotch area." The guard must
"[plush inward and upward when searching the crotch and upper thighs of
the inmate." All seams in the leg and the crotch area are to be "squeez[ed]
and knead[edi." Using the back of the hand, the guard also is to search the
breast area in a sweeping motion, so that the breasts will be "flattened."
Superintendent Vail estimated that a typical search lasts forty-five seconds
to one minute. A training film, viewed by the court, gave the impression
that a thorough search would last several minutes.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
19 See id.
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band in the prison. 20 After one inmate suffered an adverse emotional and physical reaction to a search,2 1 the inmates filed a civil
rights action contending that the searches violated their First,
Fourth, and Eighth Amendment rights.2 2 The district court
agreed with each of the inmates' constitutional arguments.2 3 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in a panel decision, 24 rejecting
each of the constitutional claims. 25 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel decision 2 6 and affirmed the district court's
finding of an Eighth Amendment violation.2 7
Writing for the court, Judge O'Scannlain first noted that an
Eighth Amendment violation requires that there be an "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'- 28 After finding that the
searches produced an "infliction of pain,"29 he then concluded that
20 See infra notes 113-14 (noting large increase in contraband discoveries); cf infra note 112 (element of surprise major reason for search policy).
The superintendent's decision to permit male as well as female guards to conduct
the searches was also based on the potential threat of lawsuits by female guards if a
same-gender search policy remained in effect. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1553 (Trott, J.,
dissenting). When he was hired, the superintendent discovered that the correctional
officers' union had filed a grievance against a policy that required female guards to
conduct all routine pat searches. Id. Before actually implementing the challenged
search policy, the superintendent created a training video, a "two officers present"
policy, and a grievance procedure for inmate complaints. Id. at 1549-52. In addition,
the superintendent sought information on civil rights law concerning exceptions to
gender-neutral employment; he was told by several persons that "bona fide occupational qualifications" would not be approved. Id. at 1553 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e)(1) (1988)).
21 Jordan,986 F.2d at 1523. The inmate, "who had a long history of sexual abuse
by men, unwillingly submitted to a cross-gender clothed-body search and suffered severe distress; she had to have her fingers pried loose from the bars she had grabbed
during the search, and she vomited after returning to her cell block." Id.
22 Id. at 1524, n.3. The inmates filed the lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988). Id. at 1523.
23 Id. at 1522 (referring to Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb.
28, 1990)).
24 Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 986 F.2d 1521
(9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
25 Id. at 1144. The three-judge panel stated that, in finding an Eighth Amendment violation, the district court had failed to give the prison officials' decisions appropriate deference. Id. at 1143. In light of this statement, the court found that the
searches were not "without penological justification," id. (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray,
682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)), and did not "violate 'evolving standards of decency.'" Id. (quoting Baumann v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
26 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1522.
27 Id. at 1530-31.
28 Id. at 1525 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
29 Jordan,986 F.2d at 1526; see infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing
outer limit of injury requirement in cruel and unusual punishment cases).
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the searches were unnecessary since they had no impact on prison
security concerns or equal employment opportunities for male
guards.3 0 The court then addressed the issue of which mental
state standard should be used to determine culpability. After concluding that the search policy was analogous to "substandard conditions of confinement," 3 1 the court applied the deliberate indifference standard.3 2 Because it found a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the court did not address the plaintiffs' other constitutional claims. 3
In a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt agreed that the
searches violated the Eighth Amendment. He stated, however,
that because the "fundamental conduct at issue" was a search, 4
the court should rely on the Fourth Amendment3 5 as the proper
36
basis for its holding.

Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526-27. Specifically, the court pointed out that prison
officials had not argued that security had been impaired since the district court's injunction. Id. The court further noted that security concerns had been met through the
exclusive use of female guards in random and routine searches of inmates. Id. at
1527. As to employment concerns, the court found that the search policy did not function to advance the employment opportunities of male guards. Id.
31 Id. at 1528.
32 Id.; see supra note 14 (outlining court's application of deliberate indifference
standard).
33 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1531.
34 Id. at 1541 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Here, the fundamental conduct at issue is a search. The searches of the female inmates, not the pain those searches inflict, is the conduct challenged
by the plaintiffs. Similarly, the cross-gender searches, not the infliction of
pain, are what the district court's injunction prohibits. Pain is simply an
incident of the unreasonable searches, not, as Judge O'Scannlain would have
it, "[tihe gravamen of the inmates' charge."
Id. (alteration in original).
The concurrence also stated that a Fourth Amendment analysis would be more
objective, and thus easier to work with than an Eighth Amendment analysis. Id. at
1542. Fourth Amendment analysis also would be more efficient, Judge Reinhardt
noted, because "while no search of prisoners' bodies could violate the [Elighth
[A]mendment without also violating the [F]ourth, the converse is not true." Id.
35 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ... ." Id.
36 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1532 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Thus, Jordan is only a
plurality opinion insofar as it relies on an Eighth Amendment violation for its holding. Id. at 1532 n.2.
Judge Reinhardt based his Fourth Amendment argument on four factors: first,
whether there was a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the government interest purported to justify it; second, whether the inmates were able to
assert their affected constitutional right in some other manner; third, the extent to
which the accommodated right would impact staff, inmates, and resources; and
30
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Trott noted that the prison administrators were confronted by numerous competing considerations. 7 Thus, he argued, the malicious intent standard should
have been applied rather than the deliberate indifference standard.38 Even assuming the deliberate indifference standard was
appropriate, he added, the defendants still had no culpable mental
state because the search policy was a carefully considered
choice.3 9 Having failed to find an actual wanton state of mind,
Judge Trott argued, the court was wrong to impute one to the
defendants.4 °
fourth, whether there was a practicable alternative which would preserve the inmate's constitutional right while having minimal impact on prison interests. Id. at
1535-37 (outlining factors adopted in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)). He
then applied a balancing test obtained from Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979),
and concluded that the searches were not " 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objectives [and] represented] an 'exaggerated response' to those concerns." Id. at
1540 (first alteration in original) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 87). For a view opposed
to this Fourth Amendment analysis, see infra note 42.
37 Jordan,986 F.2d at 1560 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("[The] Superintendent... is
engulfed in constraints, cross currents, competing values, labor unions, government
regulations, statutes, exposure to lawsuits, personal liability, and in this case, differing views of what constitutes equal protection and opportunity for women in the
workplace.").
38 Id. at 1558-60 (Trott, J., dissenting). The dissent put forth four reasons why
the higher standard of wantonness should govern the case. Id. at 1558. First, the
dissent argued that the policy had a valid penological purpose, given a dangerous
atmosphere in which hardened inmates purposefully hide contraband in or near their
private parts in order to "use our cultural sensitivity to touching each other in certain
areas as a shield for their misconduct." Id. Second, because there were competing
considerations when the officials instituted the policy, the challenged policy should
not be treated as a condition of confinement. See id. at 1558-59. The dissent further
noted that the policy did not necessarily clash with the needs of prisoners since its
purpose was, at least in part, to protect the inmates from drugs, hypodermic needles,
and other noxious contraband. Id. at 1559. Third, the dissent pointed to Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1008 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting), which extended the
malice standard to excessive force cases even absent competing penological or institutional concerns, and found it illogical to ease the inmates' burden of proof in the instant case where officials were confronted with competing considerations. Jordan, 986
F.2d at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting). Fourth, the dissent contended that the court
should defer to the judgment of prison officials where security and discipline are concerned. Id. at 1559-60.
39 Id. at 1561-62 (Trott, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1562 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott argued that the court had misapplied the law by accepting certain conclusions made by the district court. See id. at
1557. He noted that Wilson had not yet been decided when the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had a valid Eighth Amendment claim. Id. Accordingly, the
district court applied the wrong law by balancing the search policy against its alternatives, rather than looking for a culpable state of mind. Id. The district court found
that the searches were unnecessary, and thus were "without penological justification."
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In a separate dissent, Chief Judge Wallace also found the
searches not violative of the Constitution.41 In addition, he stated
that the political branches, rather than the judiciary, are best
suited to make decisions relating to the searches due to the factintensive nature of the subject matter.42
It is submitted that the Jordancourt erred in holding that the
policy of random, cross-gender searches constituted cruel and unusual punishment. It is suggested that by applying the deliberate
indifference standard to find a prison security measure unconstitutional, the Jordan court extended the standard beyond the use
intended by the Supreme Court. Further, it is submitted that this
expansion will erode the predictive value of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and allow judges to imprudently substitute their
own values for the experience and expertise of prison officials.
Part I of this Comment first describes the development of the
relevant Supreme Court authority. It then analyzes the two culpable mental state standards utilized in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Next, Part II summarizes the Jordan Court's selection
of deliberate indifference as the appropriate test. Finally, Part III
criticizes the Jordan court's selection of deliberate indifference
and proposes that the malice standard be extended to Eighth
Amendment review of prison security policy.
I.

SYNTHESIS OF SUPREME COURT CASES

Recent Supreme Court cases have recognized the complexity
and intractability of prison issues.43 The Court has emphasized
Id. But it also found that there was a "valid, rational connection" between the aim of
the search policy and legitimate governmental interest in maintaining prison secur-

ity. Id. Trott concluded that while the court purported to reject a reasonableness approach to the question of Eighth Amendment violations, it in fact tacitly adopted that
approach as taken by the district court. See id.
41 Id. at 1566 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
42 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1566 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge filed a
separate dissent because he disagreed with Judge Trott's tacit acceptance of the concurring opinion's Fourth Amendment standard. Id. The Chief Judge explained that
the balancing test employed by the concurrence was irrelevant to Turner's analysis.
Id. at 1566-67. He noted that none of the Turner factors "justifies a court in evaluating the constitutionality of a prison policy by weighing its effects on prisoners against
the institutional interests it serves." Id. at 1567. The balancing test, he argued, as
prescribed by Bell and fused with Turner by the concurrence, see supra note 32, was
employed in Turner in a First Amendment context only. Id.
43 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979). The Court in Bell held
that the Fourth Amendment rights of pre-trial detainees were not violated when restraints were reasonably related to a nonpunitive governmental objective. Id. at 540.
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that criminal offenders are incarcerated because their behavior is
antisocial or dangerous to society 44 and thus, as prisoners, they
can expect to live in some discomfort for as long as they are confined. 4 5 Though offenders do not forfeit all constitutional protec-

tions, they are entitled to more limited rights due to the exigencies
of their confinement as well as the legitimate purposes and policies of prisons.46 Since courts are not in a position to supervise
the workings of prisons, the Court has concluded that deference
should be accorded prison officials in their choice and execution of
policies that, in their judgment, are needed to maintain institutional order, security, and discipline.47 This deference applies not
only to emergency situations involving riotous inmates,48 but also
extends to "prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce ...

breaches of prison discipline."49

The Supreme Court determines whether deprivations suffered during imprisonment violate the Eighth Amendment by asking whether they amount to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."50 In Estelle v. Gamble,51 the Court for the first time
applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to punishment
that was not specifically meted out as part of the prisoner's sen44 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1983). In Hudson, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches did not apply
to prison cells. Id. at 525-26.

45 Cf Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) ("[To run afoul of the
Eighth Amendment with respect to prison conditions], a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'"
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2324 (1991) ("[O]nly those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure

of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation." (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981))); cf Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985) ("Harsh 'conditions of confinement' may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment unless such conditions 'are part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S.
at 347)).
46 See, e.g., Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545-46 (citations omitted).

47 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547).
48 Id. at 322.
49 Id.; see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992) (holding plaintiff complaining of excessive physical force must show intent to "maliciously and sadistically
...cause harm"); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-22 (stating court will hesitate to criticize

under pressure").
decisions made by prison officials "in haste ...
50 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976)).
51 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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tence.52 The plaintiff in Estelle claimed he required medical attention for an injury he sustained while performing a prison work
assignment.5 3 He was given pain killers on a number of occasions;
subsequently, he refused to work, claiming he was in too much
pain.- 4 Because of his refusal, the plaintiff was placed in solitary
confinement, where he was denied access to a doctor for almost
twelve hours. 55 The Court stated that a mental state of actual
intent to inflict pain was not required to prove an Eighth Amend57
ment violation,56 but that mere negligence would not be enough.
The Court posited that "deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] serious medical needs" would violate the Eighth Amendment5 8 if the
illness or injury transgressed contemporary, "broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." 59
In Rhodes v. Chapman,60 the Court found that "double celling" inmates did not constitute the "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain 6 1 even if the celling inflicted pain. 62 The Court rea52 Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1001 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323
(1991)).
53 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
54 Id. at 98-101.
55 Id. at 101.

56 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. But the Court has said "[i]f the pain inflicted is not
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some
mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before [the pain] can qualify [as punishment]." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991).
57 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. ("Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.").
58 Id. at 106. The Estelle Court cited several deliberate indifference cases involving medical needs, one of which held that a "doctor's choosing the 'easier and less
efficacious treatment' of throwing away the prisoner's ear and stitching the stump
may be attributable to 'deliberate indifference... rather than an exercise of professional judgment.' "Id. at 104 n.10 (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d
Cir. 1974)). The court summarized another deliberate indifference case in which a
"prison physician refuse[d] to administer the prescribed pain killer and render[ed] leg
surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of
surgeon." Id. (citing Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1971)).
59 Id. at 102. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1988)). The
Court provided no further insight into the types of injuries or illnesses that might be
considered "serious," and this issue remains open today. See, e.g., Michael C. Friedman, Cruel and UnusualPunishment in the Provisionof PrisonMedical Care: Challenging the DeliberateIndifference Standard,45 VAND. L. REv. 921, 946-49 (1992).
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Estelle, argued that "whether the constitutional standard [for cruel and unusual punishment] has been violated should turn on
the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who
inflicted it." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116.
60 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
61 Id. at 348.

62 Id. at 348-49.
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soned that only deprivations that deny the "minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities" 63 would be severe enough to form the
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.6 4
The next important Eighth Amendment case, Whitley v. Albers,65 involved a claim by an inmate who had been shot by guards
during a prison riot in which a prison official was taken hostage.6 6
The Court posited that the mental state requirement in an Eighth
Amendment case should be determined by reference to the circumstances surrounding the conduct challenged.6 7 The Court rejected Estelle's deliberate indifference standard because in that
case "the State's responsibility . . . [would] not ordinarily clash
with other equally important governmental responsibilities," and
consequently, deliberate indifference could "be established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional
concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates."68 Noting
the competing considerations present in a prison emergency,6 9
and that prison administrators should be given deference in the
area of security,70 the Court held that the applicable mental state
inquiry should focus on "whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."7 '
Id. at 347.
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 377);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("[H]arsh 'conditions of confinement' may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless such conditions are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.") (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 347).
65 475 U.S. 312 (1985).
66 Id. at 314-17.
67 Id. at 320.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 320-21.
70 Id. at 321-22. ("Prison administrators ...should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in theirjudgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.") (emphasis added) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1978)).
71 Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
The Whitley court was split 5-4 on the issue of whether the malicious intent standard should be applied. Id. at 328. The dissent argued that the malice standard was
too onerous for the plaintiff and not justified by precedent. Id. at 328-30 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that the requirement set forth by the majority for applying the standard, that there be a disturbance posing "significant risks,"
was itself a question of fact properly left for the jury to decide. Id. The dissent also
disagreed with the majority's result in applying the malice standard; the dissent
63

64
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In Wilson v. Seiter,"2 an inmate alleged that certain prison
conditions, which included inadequate heating and cooling, unclean restrooms, and unsanitary dining facilities, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.7" Reasoning as in Whitley that
the applicable mental state depends upon the "constraints facing
the official," and analogizing to the facts of Estelle, the Court
found such nonmedical "conditions of confinement" tantamount to
medical conditions because, under both circumstances, similar
constraints face the official. 4 Based on this conclusion, the Court
held that the deliberate indifference standard applied.7 5 The
stated that the situation may have improved when force was used, and that the force
used may have been unreasonable. Id. at 330-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For lower courts applying the Whitley standard, see infra note 121 (summarizing
lower court holdings using Whitley test).
72 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
73 Id. at 2322-23. ("The complaint alleged overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation,
and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates").
74 Id. at 2326-27. ("[W]e see no significant distinction between claims alleging
inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate 'conditions of confinement'
.... There is no indication that, as a general matter, the actions of prison officials
with respect to these nonmedical conditions are taken under materially different constraints than their actions with respect to medical conditions.").
75 Id. at 2327. The Court broadly concluded that, "'[w]hether one characterizes
the treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply
the 'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle.'" Id. (quoting Lafaut v.
Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987)).
Four justices concurred with the result in Wilson, but did not agree that the subjective intent of government officials should measure Eighth Amendment challenges
to conditions of confinement. Id. at 2330 (White, J., concurring). They argued that
"inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and inactions
by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of
time." Id. In those situations, "it is far from clear whose intent should be examined,
and the majority offers no real guidance on this issue ....In truth, intent simply is
not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison
system." Id.
For lower court decisions applying deliberate indifference test, see generally
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686-87 (3d Cir. 1993) (delay and release of plaintiff not
due to defendant's deliberate indifference); Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853-54 (6th
Cir. 1992) (assault on inmate result of defendant's deliberate indifference); Caldwell
v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 601 (6th Cir. 1992) (prison not deliberately indifferent to
plaintiffs medical needs); Johnson v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (N.D.
Ala. 1993) (housing plaintiff with AIDS infected inmate not due to deliberate indifference); Payne v. Monroe County, 779 F. Supp. 1330, 1333-34 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (failure to
protect plaintiff from other inmates not deliberate indifference under facts of case);
see also Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979-84 (1994) (adopting subjective deliberate indifference standard in accordance with majority of circuit courts). For a
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Court limited its holding to conditions that produce the deprivation of a "single, identifiable human need."76
In Hudson v. McMillian,"7 the Court, faced with an excessive
force claim from an inmate who had been beaten by guards, 78 applied the malice standard developed in Whitley even though the
beating occurred in the absence of a prison emergency. 79 The
Court held that the use of excessive physical force could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate suffered
no "significant injury."80
general discussion of the deliberate indifference standard, see Fred Cohen, Captives'
Legal Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1993) (theoretical
discussion of deliberate indifference standard and its application in different circuits).
76 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327. "To say that some prison conditions may interact [to
create an Eighth Amendment violation] is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing so amorphous as
'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no
specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Id. The court identified food,
warmth and exercise as such needs. Id.
77 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992).
78 Id. at 997.
79 Id. at 998. The court stated, "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically
use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.. .."
Id. at 999. The court specifically excluded de minimis uses of force from this formulation. Id. See Candelaria v. Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing claim where plaintiff alleged officer "pushed his fist against my neck so that I
couldn't move and I was losing my breath because of the pressure" but did not allege
"any repeated or continuous grabbing of the throat, or any choking" or "any resulting
physical injury"); Payton v. Vaughn, 798 F. Supp. 258, 261-62 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing claim where plaintiff submitted to strip search and alleged only
embarrassment).
For lower court cases applying malice standard outside emergency context, see
generally Cummings v. Malone, 995 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure
to require jury to apply malice standard in excessive force case was reversible error);
Flowers v. Phelps, 956 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that unjustified beating
violated Eighth Amendment under malice standard); Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d
595, 601 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding use of stun gun to maintain discipline); Cummings
v. Caspari, 821 F. Supp. 1291, 1293 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (upholding forced cell transfer of
inmate to punitive isolation).
For criticism of application of the malice standard to excessive forces outside the
emergency context, see Doretha Van Slyke, Note, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners'
Rights: The Court Giveth and The Court Taketh Away, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1727, 175059 (1993) (arguing deliberate indifference as appropriate standard for excessive force
claims). But see Diana L. Nelson, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Standard
of Eighth Amendment Application to the Use of Excessive Force Against Prison Inmates, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1814, 1815-20 (1993) (arguing extension of Whitley standard is
compatible with precedent).
80 112 S.Ct. at 998, 1000.
As in many Eighth Amendment cases, the court was divided. In his concurrence,
Justice Stevens argued that the malice standard should only be applied in the context
of prison disturbances. Id. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring). Another concurrence
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A recent Supreme Court case, Helling v. McKinney,"' involved
the question of whether mere risk of injury is sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment.8 2 The plaintiff, a nonsmoking inmate, had been assigned to a cell with an inmate who smoked five
packs of cigarettes a day."3 Stating that "reasonable safety"8 4 was
a basic human need, the Court held that the plaintiff could prove
the injury requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim if he could
show that the defendants unreasonably endangered his health in
a manner "contrary to current standards of decency."8 5 As in
argued that the standard should not be applied under any circumstance. Id. at 1003
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Two justices dissented, arguing that "cruel and unusual
punishment" claims should include proof of significant injury. Id. at 1007-08
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated, "a use of force that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be tortious, it may be criminal,
and it may even be remediable under other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but
it is not 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id. at 1005. The dissent also pointed out
that it was illogical to extend the malice standard to excessive force cases in which
officials faced no constraints, and thus, had no plausible justification for using such
force. Id. at 1008. Thomas' dissent was much criticized. See, e.g., Alexander Wohl,
Where There's Smoke: Testing the Boundaries of PrisonerRights, 78 A.B.A. J. 55
(1992).
81 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
82 Id. at 2478.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2480-81. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
85 Id. at 2481. See generally Wohl, supra note 80, at 55 (discussing disagreement
on merits of McKinney holding and prior application by lower courts of Eighth
Amendment to smoking).
In McKinney, Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia
in which it was argued that "mere risk of injury" is not sufficient objective injury to
implicate cruel and unusual punishment. 113 S.Ct. at 2482-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent expressed doubt as to whether exposure to the risk of
cigarette smoke or any other conditions of confinement could be characterized as punishment at all. Id. at 2482-84. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Summarizing the dissent's
argument, Justice Thomas wrote:
[T]o state a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a
party must prove not only that the challenged conduct was both cruel and
unusual, but also that it constitutes punishment.The text and history of the
Eighth Amendment, together with pre-Estelle precedent, raise substantial
doubts in my mind that the Eighth Amendment proscribes a prison deprivation that is not inflicted as part of a sentence.
Id. at 2485.
More recently, the Court has affirmed that actual injury need not have occurred
to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979
(1994). A slight risk of injury is insufficient, however; there must be a "substantial
risk of serious harm" to the inmate. Id.
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II.

CHOOSING THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD

DeliberateIndifference or Malicious Intent
Supreme Court case law implies that the deliberate indifference standard is inapplicable when governmental responsibilities
are of the same magnitude as the state's duty to attend to the
The Supreme Court has held that important
needs of prisoners. 87Th
governmental responsibilities include the safety of staff, administrative personnel, visitors, and inmates.8 8 The needs of prisoners
that may, if unmet, implicate cruel and unusual punishment in-

A.

clude reasonably sanitary conditions,89 medical requirements, 90

exercise, 91 and "reasonable safety" from known risks. 2 Typically,
prison officials may satisfy these needs without having to consider
significant competing interests.9 3 Thus, for example, deliberate
86 McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2481.
87 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (stating that deliberate indifference applies when officials' decision implicates no other important governmental concerns). In this setting of competing institutional concerns, the Court states that "a
deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such
competing obligations. . .

."

Id.; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.

88 475 U.S. at 320.
89 See Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990) (forcing inmates to
work in excrement without protective clothing implicates Eighth Amendment); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) (inmates entitled to reasonably sanitary conditions and adequate personal hygiene); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566
(10th Cir. 1980) (state's obligation to furnish "reasonably adequate" sanitation), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 480 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (lack of toilet facilities). But see Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316
(7th Cir.) (permitting only one shower per week amounts to deprivation of cultural
amenity, not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
90 See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991).
91 Id.

92 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93 See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1982-83 (1994) (reasonable response
to risk exonerates official even if harm to inmate is not ultimately averted); Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "availability of redress" and "existence of warning" cited
as common factors in deliberate indifference analysis (quoting Berg v. Kincheloe, 794
F.2d 457, 481 (9th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 972 (1992); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting deliberate indifference requires "actual
knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable"); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d
344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1265 (1992); cf Thomas v. Pate, 493
F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding doctor who ignored great danger, avoidable at
nominal cost, was deliberately indifferent). But see Alberti v. Harris County, 978 F.2d
893, 895 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding deliberate indifference applied to prison overcrowd-
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indifference would be the applicable standard if prison personnel
knowingly refused to assist paraplegic inmates who, as a result,
94
would be forced to sit in their own excrement.
Deliberate indifference would also be the test when an inmate
who is injured by another inmate claims he was inadequately protected by the institution holding him.9 5 In Redman v. County of
San Diego,9 6 for example, an obviously weaker inmate was raped
by his cellmate who officials knew to be sexually aggressive.9 7 The

Ninth Circuit stated that the prison officials' liability would be
measured by the deliberate indifference standard since there existed "warning and availability of redress."9 8 "Availability of redress" is significant in that it enables courts to evaluate post hoc
institutional decisions without having to defer to the expertise of
prison officials. 99
By contrast, when prison officials are confronted with competing institutional constraints, and accordingly, no easy redress is
available, their liability is typically measured by whether they acing even though legislative funding and public safety were constraints), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 2996 (1993); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering inmate safety, availability of less dangerous alternatives, and measures taken to
protect plaintiff when inmate sued after attack by fellow inmate).
94 Cf Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (analyzing paraplegic's position without entirely dismissing malicious intent standard).
95 The best-known case covering this subject matter was recently decided by the
Supreme Court. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1970. In Farmer,a transsexual inmate who
had been raped and beaten after transfer to a federal penitentiary claimed that officials violated the Eighth Amendment since the penitentiary was notorious for its inmate assaults, to which the inmate, as a transsexual, would be especially vulnerable.
Id. at 1975. The Court found that prison officials who knew of but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent a substantial risk of serious harm would violate the Constitution under a deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 1976-79.
Lower courts have also discussed inmates and violence in this context. See
LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535-37 (11th Cir. 1993); King v. Fairman, 997
F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1993); Alberti, 978 F.2d at 895; Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673,
675-76 (7th Cir. 1992); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
96 942 F.2d 1435.
97 Id. at 1437-39.
98 Id. at 1442. The official in charge of the detention facility in Redman admitted
that it was well known that the plaintiffs assailant was an "aggressive homosexual,"
and that the ideal remedy in such a case would have been to isolate the aggressive
inmate. Id. at 1448.
99 Cf Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (even in less serious cases, "denial of medical care
may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose"); supra notes 58, 67-71, 74-75, 79 and accompanying text (rule of deference
conspicuously applied to excessive force situations in Whitley and Hudson but absent
from conditions of confinement cases).
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ted maliciously.1 0 0 Though the standard is often applied to situations in which prison officials are compelled to make decisions
without any chance for reflection, it is not limited to these circumstances. 10 1 The malice standard applies not only when an inmate
is hurt in the context of a prison emergency or "lesser disruption,"
but also whenever a use of force is alleged to be excessive. 102 The
commonality between these situations is that they implicate the
notion that prison officials should be accorded deference in the
10 3
area of prison security.
B.

The Jordan Court's Methodology

As a preliminary matter, the Jordancourt found that the pat
search policy inflicted pain. 104 It next asked whether the infliction
100 See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
101 See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999. The Court in Hudson stated as a justification
for the malice test that prison riots and lesser disturbances "may require prison officials to act quickly and decisively." Id. The Court, however, found the malice standard applicable to all allegations of excessive force. Id. Thus, that officials had to
take quick and decisive action is not a prerequisite to using the malice test. See id. at
1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ('The Court today extends the heightened mental state
applied in Whitley to all excessive force cases, even where no competing institutional
concerns are present.").
102 Id. at 999.
103 Id. The Court in Hudson stated that both prison riots and lesser disturbances
implicate the notion that "'[pirison administrators... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.'" Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979))). See Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[Piroper regard [must be given] for the limited competence of federal judges to
micromanage prisons."), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989); Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d
423, 427 (8th Cir. 1990).
104 Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). In finding
the "infliction of pain," the court first described the search procedure, noting that
although officials had estimated that a complete search should require no more than
one minute, the training video suggested that a proper search would last for several
minutes. Id. at 1523. For the court's description of the search, see supra note 18. The
court then described in detail the reaction of one inmate to the search: "[S]he had to
have her fingers pried loose from bars she had grabbed during the search, and she
vomited after returning to her cellblock." Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523. The court then
recounted the district court's findings as to the personal histories of the inmates. Id.
at 1525-26. It described some of the verbal, physical, and sexual abuse that some of
the inmates had experienced, going into gruesome detail in a few instances. Id. at
1525. The court quoted a psychologist who testified that some of the women might be
left 'revictimiz[ed].' Id. at 1526 (alteration in original). The court found it sufficient
that although some expert testimony was uncertain as to the impact of the search
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was "unnecessary and wanton."10 5 Although the court acknowledged that the policy was "'addressed' to security," it agreed with
the district court that the searches were "'without penological justification.' 1 0 6 Having decided that the searches were unnecessary 10 and were undertaken in the absence of an emergency, the
court determined that the superintendent acted under "no particular constraints."'0 8 The court further stated that unlike an excessive force situation, the search policy would inflict pain on inpolicy, "the inmates' experts... were unanimously of the view that some would suffer
substantially." Id.
For a view that casts doubt on the claim of substantial suffering, see Jordan,953
F.2d at 1142. In that opinion, Chief Judge Wallace stated that the plaintiffs' experts
"admitted uncertainty about the effect of the searches, and were largely without empirical data to substantiate their predictions." Id.
After modifying the search procedures, however, the superintendent may have
found the policy more palatable. Id. at 1549-52 (Trott, J., dissenting). Both the Assistant Director and Director of the Division of Prisons of the State found cross-gender
searches unremarkable. Id. at 1547 (Trott, J., dissenting); see Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1536 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (noting difficulties due to wide disparity in expert testimony as to harmful
or beneficial effects of male guards on female inmates' rehabilitation), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1017 (1989); cf. Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1990) (indicating that very few, if any, male prisoners objected to cross-gender searches), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2807 (1991); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 132 (Or. 1981) (same).
In many other cases invasive search procedures related to security have passed constitutional muster. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1989)
(upholding "visual body cavity searches" as means of controlling contraband);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding visual strip
searches of male inmates by female guards did not violate Fourth Amendment);
Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 228 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986);
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding clothed pat-down
searches of male inmates by female guards that included groin area did not violate
Fourth Amendment); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1983); Arruda v.
Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 999 (1983).
105 Jordan,986 F.2d at 1526.
106 Id. at 1527 (alteration in original). The court also found the searches were not
necessary for security because security had not been adversely affected after the issuance of the injunction banning the search policy. Id. at 1526-27.
The Jordan court found the searches unnecessary with respect to the guards'
equal employment opportunities, as "no bid had been refused, promotion denied, nor
guard replaced" since the ban. Id. at 1527. The court stated that the conflict between
the right of one gender to work and the privacy concerns of inmates "'has normally
been resolved by attempting to accommodate both interests through adjustments in
scheduling and job responsibilities for the guards.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Fairman,
678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983)). See generally
Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and ThirdParty Privacy Interests:An Analytical Frameworkfor Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REy. 327, 337-40
(1985).
107 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1528.
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mates on an ongoing basis. 10 9 The court concluded that, as with
"conditions of confinement" cases, the deliberate indifference standard was appropriate. 11 0
III. EXTENDING THE MALICIOUS INTENT TEST TO PRISON
SECURITY POLICY

The Jordan court's decision that deliberate indifference was
the proper test to determine the superintendent's liability reflects
the court's failure to fully appreciate the complexity and problemThe cross-gender
atic nature of prison administration.'
searches, deemed by the court as unnecessary,1 1 2 were arguably
necessary and reasonable given the facts known to the superintendent at the time of the policy's implementation. 1 3 Moreover, the
superintendent instituted the searches in accordance with his con109 Id.
110 Id. at 1527-28; see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing condi-

tions of confinement cases).
111 One of the major reasons for implementing the cross-gender search policy was
so that inmates could not predict when they would be searched; according to the superintendent, "from a security point of view, if an inmate knows that there's three
male officers on [one) side of the institution, then that's the time to move the contraband. If there's no expectation.., that they might be stopped for a pat search, then it
gives them a green light to go and move." Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1554 (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
112 See supra note 107. The court mistakenly equated the lack of any change in
prison security after the searches were stopped with the necessity of the policy. But
this overlooks two key factors. First, the searches were conducted for only one day, a
period of time much too brief to provide an accurate assessment of their effectiveness.
Second, the policy was implemented to combat increasing contraband in prison, which
is a valid penological concern.
113 Jordan,986 F.2d at 1548-49 (Trott, J., dissenting). According to the superintendent, during the period from 1985 to 1988 the number of contraband discoveries
and drug offenders incarcerated in the facility had doubled, and the amount of drugs
and drug paraphernalia recovered had tripled. Id. Drug offenders constituted 31% of
the prison population, while one-fifth of the population were serving sentences for
homicide. Id. Violence committed by inmates against prison staff and other inmatesperhaps due in part to the availability of contraband weapons-had been on the increase. Id.
The superintendent took certain steps to mitigate the possible impact of the
searches on the inmates. See supra note 20. He was also confronted with labor
problems, and sought information on civil rights law concerning exceptions to gender
neutral employment: he was told by several persons that "bona fide occupational qualifications" would not be approved. Id. at 1553. The public Health and Welfare laws
allow an employer to legally hire an individual on the basis of gender, creed, or national origin when "religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a] particular business or enterprise...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)(1988).
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stitutional duty to protect inmates; 1 14 by subjecting them to some
pain in his attempt to root out dangerous contraband, he was safeguarding them from its use." 5
The Jordan majority neglected to give these concerns adequate weight. The deliberate indifference standard adopted by
the court fails to capture the competing obligations that prison administrators encounter as part of their responsibility to maintain
security." 6 By definition, the deliberate indifference test precludes consideration of other obligations; it only asks whether the
defendant knew of, and could have prevented, the serious deprivation affecting the inmates. 1 7 This narrow inquiry does not incorporate the deference prescribed by the Supreme Court for Eighth
Amendment review of actions plausibly related to security
8
measures."1
Conversely, the malice standard properly incorporates the
principle of deference to officials' expertise in choosing prison se114 Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994); see McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d
344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that constitutional duty to protect prisoners from
each other is a "logical correlative of the state's obligation to replace the means of selfprotection among its wards"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992). See generally supra
note 95 and accompanying text (recognizing that state has duty to protect inmates).
This obligation is actually a negative duty that emanates from the Eighth Amendment which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
(providing civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights); Alberti v. Harris
County, 978 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir. 1992) (overcrowding in county jail exceeded constitutional capacity), cert. denied sub nom. Richards v. Alberti, 113 S. Ct. 2996 (1993).
115 Cf Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992); Bruscino v. Carlson, 854
F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Since the principal victims of murders and armed assaults
in Marion penitentiary are inmates, the procedures that the plaintiffs describe as
cruel and unusual punishment are the very procedures that are protecting them from
murderous attacks by fellow prisoners."), cert denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989).
116 See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (primacy of
internal security); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1560 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J.,
dissenting). But see Tracy McMath, Do Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protectionfrom Body Cavity Searches? 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 748 (1987) (arguing that nonessential security interests often outweigh inmates' constitutional
rights).
117 See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816 (1986); see also supra note 58 (discussing first and subsequent deliberate
indifference cases). The Whitley Court noted that the deliberate indifference standard
is appropriate only in situations where competing governmental responsibilities are
absent. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
118 See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999; Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1559-61; Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's position on inmates' constitutional rights and deference owed to
prison officials).
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curity policy.'1 9 The "malicious and sadistic" state of mind requirement may appear onerous, but in effect, a finding of cruel
and unusual punishment depends primarily on the reasonableness of the challenged act at the time of its commission. 120 The
standard allows judges to consider several factors: the need for
the force in question; the "relationships between the need and the
2
amount of force that was used"; the seriousness of the injury;' '
the threat to staff and inmates "as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials"; and any efforts made to mitigate the effects
of a forceful response. 122 By examining these factors, one may infer whether force may "plausibly have been thought necessary," or
alternatively, evidenced a "knowing willingness" to inflict unjustified pain. 123 The malice standard is appropriate for review of a
prison measure arguably instituted for security purposes because
119 See Hudson, 112 S. Ct at 999; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987) (primacy of judicial deference in area of prison security); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21;
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1559-61; see also ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 2, at 362 n.9
(noting high degree of deference required when scrutinizing prison conditions under
Eighth Amendment).
120 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (indicating that reasonableness of perceived
threat to safety is relevant factor in malice test) Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522,
523 (5th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1447 (5th Cir.
1993) (use of "choke hold and other force" to subdue a "non-resisting" inmate evidenced malice), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2998 (1993); Flowers v. Phelps, 956 F.2d 488,
491 (5th Cir. 1992) (beating judged excessive when "provocation [by plaintiff] did not
justify conduct of the... defendants"); Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir.
1990) (no Eighth Amendment violation because "jailers' perception of the potential
security risk was reasonable"); Cooper v. Ellsworth Work Correctional Facility, 817 F.
Supp. 84, 86 (D. Kan.) (malice not found when "officers used force only after plaintiffs
repeated refusals to follow a reasonable order"), affd, 2 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 1993);
Cummings v. Caspari, 821 F. Supp. 1291, 1293 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (pinning plaintiff
down and "forcibly subdu[ing]" him after he rushed prison officials was "good faith
effort to restore discipline"); Jones v. Huff, 789 F. Supp. 526, 536-37 (N.D. N.Y. 1992)
(kicks administered by defendant were "unreasonable and excessive" and thus cruel
and unusual punishment). But see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 ("[tlhe infliction of pain in
the course of a prison security measure ... does not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force unauthorized or applied . . . was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict
sense."); Jasper v. Thalacker, 999 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).
By contrast, deliberate indifference is typically difficult to prove even where the
defendant acted unreasonably. See supra note 75 (discussing cases applying deliberate indifference).
121 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1972) (stating foundation for
malice test later adopted by Whitley Court), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
122 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (adapting Johnson court's analysis while adding additional factors).
123 Id.
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information that might indiit takes into account all the relevant
12 4
cate a culpable state of mind.

The inapplicability of the deliberate indifference standard to
prison security policy is made obvious by the substantive limitations of the Jordancourt's reasoning. 12 5 Agreeing that the search
policy was "addressed to security," the court nevertheless disagreed with the means chosen by the superintendent. 126 The superintendent clearly faced numerous constraints involving penological, labor, and legal issues. 127 Yet, the court failed to give
these constraints their proper recognition. 12S The Jordan court
also conducted a shallow inquiry into whether the superintendent
actually knew of the risks the searches posed before implementing
them; the court never even inquired whether deliberate indifference is applicable with respect to risks to indeterminate prisoners. 129 Ultimately, the court attributed a culpable state of mind to
Cf id. (adding objective mental state element to Johnson analysis).
See, e.g., Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1558-61 (Trott, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 37 (listing dissent's four reasons for concluding Jordan majority's reasoning
faulty); infra notes 126-129 (discussing flaws in Jordanmajority's reasoning).
126 Cf Jordan,986 F.2d at 1565 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("It is not appropriate to
sweep away the testimony of [Superintendent Vail and other officials] as conjectural,
speculative, and illusory. ... If the prison officials' rationale is so transparent and
flimsy, one wonders why they stick to it?") (citations omitted).
127 See supra note 37 (listing constraints on superintendent's judgment). See generally JAms B. JACOBS & NopAm MEACHA CROTTY, GUARD UNIONS AND THE FuRE
OF THE PRISONS 43-48 (1978) (discussing heightened effects of unions on penal policy).
128 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing deference
principle).
129 See Jordan,986 F.2d at 1529. The structure of the majority's argument supports the proposition that it did not inquire about the defendants' knowledge of serious injury: no such inquiry had been made by the time it postulated that the "[Superintendent]'s attempts to ensure that the searches were conducted in a professional
manner do not negate the conclusion that he was deliberately indifferent to the inmates' pain when it became obvious that the pain would be inflicted no matter how
professionally the searches were conducted." Id. All that is known is that the Superintendent had been warned of possible "psychological trauma." Id. at 1528. Given
only that the Superintendent had been warned of the probability of some trauma, the
court concluded that "[i]f a prison administrator decides to ignore grave suffering because of irrelevant or unimportant concerns, that administrator demonstrates [ I deliberate indifference .... " Id. at 1529 (emphasis added). It may be that the inmates'
"shocking" testimony "seeped" into the court's analysis of the subjective element. Id.
at 1546 (Trott, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Jordancourt failed to consider the risk of injury with respect to a
particular inmate; other courts have held that merely because injury to indeterminate
inmates is inevitable in a prison setting, failure to prevent such injury is not tantamount to deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir.
1992) ("fact that [officers] knew that [facility] housed many violent prisoners and that
prison violence did occur [was] not sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference ....
124
125
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the superintendent because it disagreed with his choice of security
measure. 130 In doing so, the court judged the superintendent's decisions under a reasonableness standard, which the deliberate indifference standard does not permit.
CONCLUSION

Although the Jordan court purported to apply the deliberate
indifference standard in its Eighth Amendment analysis, it actually employed a balancing test. It could not have avoided doing so.
The deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate when scrutinizing measures plausibly related to prison security policy. In
this context, it is difficult to ever categorize a prison official as deliberately indifferent given the time and effort required to formulate and adopt security policies, especially when, as in Jordan,numerous attempts are made to allay inmates' concerns. In order to
take into account all the constraints facing prison officials when
they implement security policy, the Jordancourt should have applied the malice standard. Had the court done so, it could have
properly analyzed the means chosen by the superintendent for
eliminating contraband in a manner consistent with the Supreme
court's prescription that deference be accorded prison officials' expertise. In this way, the rights to which inmates are entitled
Failure to lessen the threatof violence" in prisons does not constitute a culpable state
of mind for Eighth Amendment purposes) (emphasis added); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867
F.2d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1992) (failure of officials to prevent an inmate's suicide did
not constitute deliberate indifference "in the absence of [same inmate's] previous
threat or earlier attempted suicide"); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347-48 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("Once we equate 'recklessness' with intent.., it becomes important to give
recklessness a definition that separates 'punishment'... from the unwelcome injuries
that occur when so many violent persons are locked up together"), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1265 (1992); Payne v. Monroe County, 779 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(plaintiff who "failed to offer sufficient evidence that any defendant was aware... of a
strong likelihood that plaintiff would be assaulted" did not make out an Eighth
Amendment claim) (emphasis added); cf Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
the [Jordan court's] opinion unleashes a management nightmare. It takes
the characteristics of some and projects them onto the entire class .... Now
... a male prisoner with a history of abuse as a child by a man-and our
prisons are full of them-will surely be able to make a case against random
pat-down searches by male officers....
Id.; cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1982-83 (1994) (reasonable response to
risk exonerates official even if harm to inmate is not ultimately averted).
130 Cf Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("We may not favor this
controversial practice ... but as to Superintendent Vail it is... wrong... [and] highly
unfair to conclude his behavior was obdurate and wanton. Even if we believe he has
erred in his judgment, it cannot be said his error was not 'in good faith.' ").
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would be enforced while still providing prison officials the ability
to implement appropriate security measures.
Ian M. Ogilvie

